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ABSTRACT
Nelson, Katharine Andersen. M.A. The University of Memphis. May 2010. India
as a New Model of Late Development? Assessing the Relationship between Democracy
and Service-Led Growth. Major Professor: Matthias Kaelberer, Ph.D.
This paper assesses the relationship between democracy and a service-led model
of economic growth by analyzing the political and economic development of India. The
Indian model of development is unique for two reasons. First, India’s economic growth is
due, in large part, to the success of its service sector as opposed to growth in traditional
industry. Second, it has seen its economy take off under democratic rule. This paper asks
whether these two unique features of the Indian case are related. Does democracy
necessitate a service sector path to development? It appears that linkages exist between
democracy and the service-led path to development. This paper explores the
generalizability of the India model of development and assesses the sustainability of
services led growth.
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Chapter 1
Problem/Purpose
This thesis explores the relationship between regime type and economic growth.
Specifically, it assesses the extent to which democracy1 and high rates of economic
growth are compatible. The current work builds off the work of Deutsch (1961),
Gerschenkron (1966), Huntington (1966, 1991), and Kohli (2004, 2006, 2009) who argue
that democratic regime types are poor promoters of high levels of late economic growth
and development2. However, this thesis departs from previous work as it is argued that
democracy is, in fact, compatible with high rates of late economic growth, but
incompatible with the traditional development model of industrialization.
The method of analysis is a case study on India. India was chosen because it has
maintained democracy since its independence from Great Britain in 1947 and allows for
the evaluation of economic growth prospects under conditions of democratic rule. While
a single case study is limited in terms of generalizability, the political and economic
development of India is still worth studying because while democracy has remained
constant, economic growth has varied dramatically. India’s first four decades following
independence were characterized by stagnant economic growth. However, over the past
two decades, the Indian economy has exploded, projecting an average growth rate of
almost 9% for 2010 (Lamont 2010). What explains the variation in India’s economic
1

Democracy is defined as a system of government in which political leaders are elected
periodically through relatively fair and honest elections. Constituents have rights to assembly and
association and can express political preferences via voting. The party in power remains in power until a
new party is voted in through an election. Opposition parties must be present and considered viable
alternatives to the party in power (Burdekin 2009).
2

Late economic growth and development refers to countries in pursuit of growth after 1950. These
countries are considered “late” because major industrialization and modernization has already taken place
in the United States and Europe by this time.
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growth? Upon exploration and examination of the India case, it is argued that democracy
in India discouraged traditional industrialization but has supported a new model of late
development: service-led growth.
The Plan of the Thesis
In order to assess the relationship between Indian democracy and its new model
of service-led growth, it is necessary to trace both political and economic development in
India prior to Independence through the present. Chapter 2 begins with an exploration of
democratization in India. It is argued that British colonial rule and India’s incredible
demographic diversity are the two factors primarily responsible for Indian democracy.
Chapter 3 traces Indian economic development theory and explores the compatibility of
democracy and traditional industrialization. Chapter 4 ties chapters two and three
together and explores potential explanations for the compatibility of democratic regime
types and service led growth models of development. Chapter 5 concludes by assessing
the generalizability and sustainability of India’s new model of service-led growth.
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Chapter 2
Indian Democracy, 1947-2010
India, the seventh largest territorial state in the world, home to four major
religions and twenty-eight different languages, and a population of 1.1 billion people, is
one of the most diverse countries in the world (Index Mundi 2010; World Bank 2009)1.
India’s vast diversity and size presents unique national governance challenges (CIA
World Factbook 2010). Despite these challenges, however, India has maintained electoral
democracy since independence from Great Britain in 1947 and today holds the title of the
world’s largest democracy (World Bank 2009). That Indian democracy has survived
nearly seventy years in a country wrought with widespread poverty and incredible
diversity of interests and groups at first glance seems remarkable. However, this thesis
argues that it is exactly India’s incredible diversity that makes democracy not only
possible, but necessary. The success of Indian democracy is largely a consequence of its
history of indirect British colonial rule and its incredible demographic diversity. The
success of democracy in India suggests that, despite the conventional wisdom of the
economic and development literature, democracy can survive in a diverse developing
country (Gershenkron 1966; Moore 1966; Kohli 2009).
British Colonial Legacy
The relationship between Great Britain and India began in the early 17th century
with the creation of the British East India Company (BEIC). The BEIC’s initial interest in
India was purely economic. India’s geographic location made it a very valuable point of
1

India’s population is 80.5% Hindu, 13.4% Muslim, 2.3% Christian, 1.9% Sikh, 1.9% Other. The
five most common languages spoken are Hindi (41%), Bengali (8.1%), Telugu (7.2%), Marathi (7%), and
Tamil (5.9%). “English enjoys associate status but is the most important language for national, political,
and commercial communication” (Index Mundi 2010,
http://www.indexmundi.com/India/demographics_profile.html).
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transit for trade to and from Europe, the East Indies, and China. By the 17th century, the
BEIC became a crucial element in Great Britain’s economy as India became Britain’s
primary supplier of “raw materials, a safe field for capital investment [and] a crucial
element in her balance of payments” (Gallagher and Seal 1981, 387). India became the
focal point and necessary ingredient for the “continued expansion of world trade”
(Gallagher and Seal 1981, 387). As the BEIC expanded its presence in India, the once
purely economic relationship became political as leaders of the BEIC partnered with local
Indian princes, in what was referred to as the system of the Raj, and acquired increasing
control over local Indian affairs. Over time, however, it became clear to the British
government and the BEIC that its success and “the pattern of trade and investment
…depended upon dominion” in India (Gallagher and Seal 1981, 387).
As British economic dominance manifested itself into British political dominance
in India, distrust and hostility grew between native Indian princes and the BEIC. It
became increasingly clear that Britain’s role in India was purely exploitive. “The British
were anxious to pull resources out of India, not to put them into it. So a cardinal rule was
that India was not to be a burden on the British tax-payer; she had to be self-supporting,
secure and at peace” (Gallagher and Seal 1981, 389). This is evidenced by the fact that
the BEIC orchestrated the construction of a rail, road, and port system to facilitate trade
paid for by the Indian government and profited by the BEIC (Gallagher and Seal 1981).
The economic and political tension between India and the British East India
Company culminated in The Mutiny of 1857, a rebellion of native Indians against British
domination (Belmekki 2008). "What distinguished the events of 1857 was their scale and
the fact that for a short time they posed a military threat to British dominance” (Bayly
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1990, 170). The Mutiny signaled the British Crown that the BEIC was no longer strong
enough to control and manage the political system in India and that more official British
involvement was necessary. In 1857, the BEIC was absorbed by the British Crown,
marking the beginning of official colonial rule in India (Bayly 1990, 194-197).
Under British colonial rule, a new system of indirect rule was put in place. India
was divided into Princely territories, 565 in total. Native Princes remained in control of
their local territory while the British crown maintained control over India’s military and
foreign affairs (Belmekki 2008). The system of indirect British rule relied upon the
cooperation of local Indian princes. A political bargain was struck which allowed Britain
to take its cut of Indian revenues while promising to play a limited role in local politics.
Under this system, local princes handled the distribution of resources and resolution of
conflicts without much accountability to the British Raj. “By necessity the British had to
be a laisser-faire regime…the rhetoric of their proconsuls disguised a ground-floor reality
where they governed in name but Indians ruled in practice” (Gallagher and Seal 1981,
390).
From the beginning of British colonial rule in India, Britain’s democratic norms
of tolerance and rule of law were rhetorically encouraged in India. In order to sustain the
system of British governance and Indian local rule, it was imperative that India remained
peaceful. As such, Britain encouraged the Indian population to embrace norms of
tolerance and respect for the rule of law. In Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858, she
promised to,
respect the rights, dignity and honour of native Princes… as we desire that they,
as well as our own subjects, should enjoy the prosperity and …social
advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good
government...[W]e disclaim alike the right and desire to impose our convictions
5

on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be
in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious
faith or observances, but that all alike shall enjoy the equal and impartial
protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be
in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious
belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure (Queen
Victoria Proclamation 1858).
The introduction of democratic norms in India is not inconsequential. By introducing
cultural norms of respect for human rights, individualism, property rights and the rule of
law, British colonial rule can be credited for laying the foundation of what would
eventually become an independent democratic Indian state.
However, as British economic interest in India intensified through the 20th
century, London encouraged Calcutta to shift from a system of indirect rule to system of
more centralized, direct rule. It was argued that an increase in control and participation in
local Indian affairs would allow Britain to increase its extractive power. “Step by step the
British imposed upon India an interconnected structure of government which stretched
from its summit at Whitehall to the districts and taluks at the base, an administration
close at the top, however lightly it rested upon the base” (Gallagher and Seal 1981, 390).
Increased British involvement in local Indian affairs required a restructuring of local
government. First, installment of the British administrative structure at the local level
required increased involvement and participation of the indigenous Indian population.
The British administration needed more employees to staff its growing infrastructure. In
so doing, the British conditioned the local Indian political leaders to work within a
democratic administrative bureaucracy. The unintended consequence of the centralization
of British colonial government in India resulted in greater unification and organization of
local Indian politics.

6

As [British colonial] government intervened from above in spheres which
previously it had left alone, it was brought into more direct contact with interests,
once safely insulated in the localities; [local Indian rulers] now had to shift their
attention to the higher levels from where the intervention was coming in order to
protect their franchises and immunities. The modest representative bodies which
the British created were themselves an incentive for Indians to build a matching
structure of political organization, connected from the centre to the periphery,
capable of negotiating with the British at the top in the name of constituents at the
base. Thus one largely unintended result of these greater interventions into Indian
society, and the steps taken to soften their impact, was to edge Indian politics out
of their local arenas (Gallagher and Seal 1981, 392).
In effect, greater centralization of the British colonial state resulted in a stronger,
more unified, more democratic and representative Indian political structure than ever
before. British administrative infrastructure was designed to accommodate electoral
politics. Indians were allowed to run for a seat on government councils at the local,
provincial and national level. Election was indirect, but required the support of the local
Indian population for nomination and a peaceful approach to negotiation and governance
for approval of election by the British Raj. The development of government councils
encouraged broader participation by Indians in political affairs which further solidified
the norms of electoral democracy within the indigenous Indian population. It also
encouraged attention to local, provincial and national politics as increasing centralized
control at the top required approval from above for local action.
Both World War I and World War II acted as decentralizing forces in British
colonial government in India. During World War I, with British attention focused on the
war efforts, indigenous Indian politics turned inward and developed a degree of
autonomy that was unprecedented. By the 1930s, Britain was in a considerably weaker
financial position and so retracted its control over Indian regional and local politics,
granting provincial power back to indigenous Indian leaders. Great Britain still
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maintained control at the center over matters that affected the homeland, notably defense,
foreign policy and internal security (Gallagher and Seal 1981, 406). The impact of WWII
on British colonial rule was similar to the impact WWI had on British governance in
India and by the close of the war, Britain handed over power and withdrew from India
completely (Menon 1958).
The British fluctuation between decentralized, indirect rule and centralized, direct
rule in India is not without historical consequence. It ultimately mobilized the local
Indian population and increased participation in national political affairs. It also created a
class of leadership in India, most notably the local Princes and those elected to
governance councils at the local, provincial and national level which acquired increasing
control over Indian politics. British colonial rule also laid the foundation for a federal
organization of states in India following independence. The development of indigenous
political leadership and the wellsprings of a federal state organizational structure along
with the imbuement of values like tolerance, rule of law, and property rights provides at
least a partial explanation for India’s democratic form of governance following
independence.
The relationship between Great Britain and India during colonial rule was not one
characterized by partnership but rather by domination and convenient exploitation.
However, it appears that the legacies of British colonial rule can, in several ways, be
credited for the stability of democracy in India today. In a recent study of British colonial
rule, Lange (2004) assesses the relationship between direct and indirect British colonial
rule and a variety of post-colonial development indicators. His quantitative study of
thirty-three former British colonies provides evidence that supports the findings of Boone

8

(1994), Mamdani (1996), Migdal (1988), and Reno (1995) whose qualitative research
suggests that “institutional legacies of indirect rule left ineffective central
administrations, empowered local chiefs, and thereby created a system of decentralized
despotism that has left the state both ineffective and near collapse (Lange 2004, 906).
Lange also finds support for the arguments of Amsden (1985), Huff (1994), Kohli (1994),
Lange (2003) and Wade (1990) who posit, “alternatively …that direct and bureaucratic
colonial rule left legacies that made possible effective states and thereby state-led
development” (Lange 2004, 906).
Lange finds that indirect British colonial rule is highly and significantly
associated with lower levels of post-colonial political stability, less bureaucratic
effectiveness, lower levels of rule of law, and higher levels of corruption and an increased
state regulatory burden. Additionally, while the relationship is less robust, Lange finds
that indirect British colonial rule is also negatively associated with post-colonial
democracy2.
The Indian case partially confirms and partially disconfirms Lange’s findings.
First, it is important to note that India is a unique case. British colonial rule in India was
not uniformly direct or indirect, but rather fluctuated over time and circumstance. While
it appears that India’s historical bureaucratic effectiveness, lack of state regulatory
burden, rule of law and lack of government corruption (to be discussed in detail below)
are consistent with the findings, what is most surprising is that despite the largely indirect
style of British colonial rule in India, India emerged following independence as not only
a relatively stable state, but a democracy. It appears that the combination of indirect
colonial rule in rural India and the relatively direct and centralized role at the center in
2

Lange’s 2004 study included a set of 33 former British colonies, one of which was India.
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India is responsible for the weak, but relatively effective bureaucratic, democratic postcolonial Indian state.
Independence: Nehru and The Congress Party
The transition to independence in India began long before 1947. As early as the
end of WWI, Britain recognized that a British Indian empire was unrealistic given the
decline in their relative economic and political standing following the war (Spear 1958).
Discussions of transitions to Indian independence began. Three main players emerged in
the independence debate: The Indian National Congress (largely a Hindu party), The
League (largely a Muslim party) and the British. Britain’s declared goal was to hand over
power to a united India (Spear 1958). However, distrust between The Congress and the
British had been long established and The Congress questioned whether Britain truly
sought to establish a “united India by general agreement” (Spear 1958). The League and
The Congress were divided on religious grounds: according to Jinnah, the leader of the
League, “Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word but are in
fact different and distinct social orders” (Jinnah quoted in Spear 1958, 175). By 1945, it
appeared that a general agreement between all three groups was impossible and in 1947
the partition of the British Indian Empire resulted in the creation of the states India and
Pakistan. Partition, according to Spear, “became imperative to avoid civil war and
anarchy” (Spear 1958, 176).
Unfortunately, partition only successfully prevented anarchy. The Punjab
massacres and massive migrations that occurred following independence resulted in the
deaths of about one million people. The partition required the division of the Sikh people,
just the catalyst necessary to spark violence. Over 12 million people crossed the India-
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Pakistan border in either direction. Violence occurred as Muslims fled from Eastern
Punjab, the newly created state of Pakistan, and Hindus and Sikhs moved west from
Pakistan to India.
In light of the violence that occurred immediately following independence, it is
even more remarkable that democracy survived in India. On the whole, countries which
gained independence following WWII in Asia, Latin America and Africa were highly
susceptible to authoritarian government as a result of the high level of political and social
unrest that occurred following independence. Independent India, however, had two
unique factors that contributed to democratic success: a well established Congress party
dating back to 1885 and a highly effective Civil Service administrative institutional
structure (Huntington 1968). During the 1950s,
India entered independence with not only two organizations but two highly
developed- adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent- institutions ready to
assume primary responsibility for these functions. The Congress Party, founded in
1885, was one of the oldest and best organized political parties in the world; the
Indian Civil Service, dating from the early nineteenth century, was appropriately
hailed as ‘one of the greatest administrative systems of all time.’ The stable,
effective, and democratic government of India during its first twenty years of
independence rested far more on this institutional inheritance than it did on the
charisma of (India’s first Prime Minister) Nehru (Huntington 1968, 84).

It is clear that while the British may be discredited for failing to promote Indian social
and economic development during the colonial period, the institutions that were put in
place during the colonial period contributed significantly to the success of democracy
following India’s independence. The British colonial period can be credited with the
institutionalization of democracy, tolerance, rule of law, and pluralism in India.
British colonialism can be credited for both the development of the Congress
Party and the Civil Service, though for different reasons. The Congress Party, established
11

in the late nineteenth century, rose out of an Indian nationalist movement. In effect,
British domination provided a single target for Indian nationalists. Uniting not along
religious lines, the Congress Party pitted itself against colonial domination and in effect,
created an organic pluralist political organization in Indian society. The Congress Party
attracted members throughout Indian society, most notably from various castes.
Following Huntington, the stability and longevity of the Congress Party can, in part, be
explained by its foundation in India’s traditional patronage networks. For Huntington,
patronage “has been a major source of strength” for the Congress party (Huntington
1968, 70).
India’s caste system, the social stratification of different groups in society, served
as the basis for the Congress Party’s link throughout and within society (Huntington
1968). While most if not all party leadership came from the upper Castes in Indian
society, especially during the twenty years following independence, the hierarchical
social network provided the foundation for political linkages from the upper castes to
lower castes, in effect capturing the entire population. “[E]specially during the 1950s...
the Congress forged patronage links with regional and local influentials, thus creating a
chain of authority that stretched from the capital city to villages” (Kohli 2009, 23). While
the caste system was a system of social hierarchical stratification that resulted in
widespread prejudice and inequality, it also functioned as a legitimate social
organizational institution in India. The Caste system initially provided the patronage
network on which stood Congressional Party control and may be at least partially
credited as an explanation for democratic and political stability following independence.
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The second explanation for democratic and political stability in post-colonial
India, the “highly developed” Civil Service, can be directly credited to the British. As
discussed in detail above, the tendency towards centralization and institutionalization
during the late nineteenth and early to mid twentieth centuries of British colonial rule in
India resulted in the creation and establishment of a highly effective administrative state
within India, adequately equipped to handle the multiple demands a young democratic
state must address. However, while India’s administrative infrastructure was well
equipped to handle multiple demands from a democratic society, it was not tested, at least
during the first ten or fifteen years of independence.
[L]evels of political mobilization in India during the 1950s and the early 1960s
were relatively low, and elite politics tended to accommodate intra-elite struggles.
While Nehru was definitely ‘first among equals,’ the fact is that cabinet
government during this early period was a reality, the parliament functioned as an
important deliberating and debating forum, opposition was treated with respect,
the Congress party had internal democracy and an identity independent of the
government, chief ministers of states often possessed independent political base,
and such other state institutions as the constitution, the civil service, and the
judiciary enjoyed a degree of non-partisan integrity. There were thus important
institutional checks on the personal power of Nehru (Kohli 2009, 26).
Politics, during the Nehru and Congress party years, were on the whole dominated
by a small group of elites in intra-elite struggles, orchestrated in large part by the Caste
system. “Members of the dominant castes and other influential ‘big men’ in villages were
thus often able to sway the political behavior of those below them, namely, the middle
and lower rural strata” (Kohli 2009, 26). Mass mobilization of India’s masses would not
occur until the mid 1960s, as democracy spread from the top, down.
Indira Ghandi and Populism/Clientelism
One of the great ironies in India’s democratic history is that as democracy took
root in a broader sense among the lower castes and rural classes, the stability of
13

democracy in India began to crumble. During the mid 1960s and 1970s, Indian politics
increasingly came to be characterized by populism and clientelism. As Kohli describes,
“the more the power relations in the social structure, especially in the villages, were
democratized, the more personalized and centralized became decision making at the top
of India’s political pyramid” (Kohli 2009, 26). The old Caste based patronage networks
that the Congress Party relied upon were disintegrating, causing the party to lose ground
and legitimacy with the newly mobilized citizens (Singh 1971). The “Congress system
[of the 1950s and early 1960s]...in which the ruling party acted like a party of consensus
and the opposition acted like parties of pressure...provided the chief competitive
mechanism of the Indian political system in which competition had been internalized and
carried on within the ruling party” (Singh 1971, 66-67, see also Kothari 1964).
Beginning in the early 1960s, however, the Congress Party base was destabilizing
and the old ‘Congress System’ was being challenged by many new political parties that
no longer saw themselves as ‘parties of pressure’ but as legitimate opposition parties.
Recognizing the disconnect between the old elite Congress Party of the 1950s and the
newly politically mobilized lower caste and rural voting population, Indira Gandhi ran for
Prime Minister on a pro-poor campaign. In an attempt to redefine the Congress party and
capitalize on the failure of older Congress Party members to identify and connect with the
majority of India, Indira Gandhi based her electoral campaign on promises to alleviate
poverty, to be a “champion for the poor” (Thakur 1976, 264). She was elected Prime
Minister in 1966 in a landslide election based on big promises, many of which she would
fail to keep.
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By the 1967 general elections, it became clear to all that the era of one party
dominance had passed (Narain 1969).
For the first time since independence, 9 out of 17 states, with 65 per cent of
India’s population, came under the rule of inherently unstable [new] coalitions.
Since the Congress, the largest party in these states, did not have a majority, the
highly fragmented opposition found an opportunity to come to power-- so much
so that principles, programmes and ideologies were set aside in order to find a
place in the ministries. Political parties that had never cooperated, even for the
sake of winning elections, were now eager to join hands (Singh 1971, 69).
Coalitions formed between the unlikeliest pairings of political parties including
the “communists, the socialists, splinter Congress groups, the Jan Sangh [the militant
Hindu party], the Muslim League, [and] the Swatanantra [a party of free enterprise and
vested interests]” (Singh 1971, 69). The decline in the Congress Party’s dominance over
Indian political affairs sparked power-hungry interests in the leadership of the opposition
parties. Untenable alliances were formed purely on the basis of gaining power, often
along conflicting ideological lines. By the late 1960s, the stability of India’s party system,
one of the two major pillars on which political and democratic stability in India rested,
was in serious decline.
Indira Gandhi’s popular and clientelistic style of rule, in large part a consequence
of the decline in old-style Congress Party dominance and increased political mobilization
and participation from the lower castes and rural classes, ultimately resulted in the
destruction of the autonomy of the state infrastructure as well. Once in office, Indira
Gandhi’s cabinet and political appointments were made based on loyalty and favoritism
and she politicized the Civil Service, police, armed forces and even the Constitution.
Under Indira Gandhi, nothing in Indian politics was immune from “partisan political
struggles” (Kohli 2009, 26-27). What was once referred to as the “greatest administrative
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systems of all time” no longer resembled its post-colonial structure (Huntington 1968,
84).
For early modernization theorists, this change in Indian politics does not come as
a surprise. According to Huntington (1968, 70), “Corruption is...a product of
modernization and particularly of the expansion of political consciousness and political
participation.” India did not experience the populist and clientelistic tendencies of the late
1960s and 1970s sooner after independence in large part because democratic politics
were limited to a small group of elite Congress Party members, whose patronage
networks successfully limited the political influence of the masses. “The reduction of
corruption in the long run requires the organization and structuring of that participation.
Political parties are the principal institution of modern politics which can perform this
function” (Huntington 1968, 70-71). Furthermore, if political parties are to provide the
structure for democratic participation, they must be organized by ideology and interests.
In short, effective and stable parties have to identify themselves based on specific
positions on specific interests.
When tested by mass political mobilization and participation, weaknesses in
India’s Congress Party were exposed. The “all-India” Congress party was not unified by
ideology and interests but rather acted as the catch-all Indian nationalist party. A
charismatic leader like Prime Minister Nehru together with the momentum and
excitement of independence carried the Congress party for the better half of two decades.
However, increased mobilization and participation by a larger percentage of Indian
society uprooted the Congress Party’s foundation. Without the stability of Congress
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Party hegemony, power hungry opposition leaders took advantage of the new, largely
unaffiliated class of new voters.
Without the stability of the Congress Party system, Indian politics transformed
into the all-too familiar populist and clientelistic politics common in other newlyindependent post-colonial states following WWII in Latin America and elsewhere. The
political situation in India became so critical that in 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
declared a state of emergency. This is arguably this darkest period in Indian democracy.
The state of emergency was proclaimed to
counter an alleged conspiracy aimed at violently overthrowing the legal
Government. Thousands of opponents of Mrs. Gandhi’s regime were arrested
under specially enacted preventive detention laws that left them with no legal
recourse to freedom; fundamental rights and liberties of all were suspended; and
even the legality of the emergency measures was decreed to be no longer subject
to judicial review (Thakur 1976, 263).

While the events of 1975 are extreme, in many ways they were a natural progression of
events during Indira’s Gandhi’s administration. The previous year, in 1974, several
popular uprisings in response to the Indira Gandhi administration’s failure to make good
on her campaign promises, most notably reducing poverty, led to a “ruthless suppression
of the railways workers’ strike, using tactics of imprisonment, and repression” (Thakur
1976, 263-264). In addition, “runaway inflation and ever-growing numbers falling below
the poverty line; and increasing restlessness and violence manifested in strikes and
demonstrations. ...Mrs. Gandhi’s popular image as a champion of the poor had slipped
from its peak of 1971-72” (Thakur 1968, 264).
While some argue that Indira Gandhi’s declaration of emergency rule was more a
reflection of her loss of control and power over the political situation, the events of 1975
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would likely have jolted any head of state. “In 1975 India experienced its greatest
political crisis since independence...a crisis of deterioration, and a crisis of democracy”
(Palmer 1976, 95). While it is not surprising that popular uprisings and protests would
result from Indira Gandhi’s poor record of public performance, her general failure to
follow through on her campaign promises, and the sluggish economic performance of the
recent past, what is surprising is the method by which the opposition voiced their
concerns. Members of opposition parties assassinated the Railways Minister, L.N. Mishra
and the Inspector-General of Police, Mizoram.
In the succeeding months serious acts of violence occurred almost daily. They
indicated that not only was there a breakdown of law and order, but also that
political opponents of the existing regime were resorting increasingly to extraconstitutional methods. These are the conditions that Mrs. Gandhi must have had
in mind when, in her broadcast to the nation on June 26 immediately following
the proclamation of a national emergency, she charged that ‘forces of
disintegration are in full play and communal passions are being aroused,
threatening our unity (Palmer 1976, 95-96).
Remarkably, the state of emergency ended peacefully, Indira stepped down from
power, and elections resumed. In 1979, opposition party member of the Janata Party, Shri
Desai, was elected Prime Minister (Prime Ministers of India 2010).
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Figure 1: This graph depicts democratic authority in India from independence in 1947 to 2009. Despite the
decrease in democratic stability from the mid 70s to early 90s, it is clear that democracy has consolidated in
India, as it is the only game in town. The data used to create this graph are Polity IV scores of regime type.
The Polity IV measure of regime type ranks countries from -10 (pure autocracy) to +10 (pure democracy).
It is clear that India has scored highly on the democracy scale since independence. Source: Marshall and
Jaggers 2010 <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ind2.htm>.

Contemporary Indian Democracy
While Indian democracy has faced challenges since Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi’s brief declaration of emergency rule in the late 1970s, democracy has prevailed,
as depicted in Figure 1. Considering that when India set out to be democratic, successful
democracies tended to be white, rich, Christian and with a single dominant language, its
success over 60 years is significant in two ways. First, Indian democracy suggests that
democratic rule not only can prevail, but manages politics in a highly diverse society
quite well. Poverty, massive illiteracy and social diversity on a sub-continental scale
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were not arguments against democracy, they were arguments for it. Second, “India's
Republican democracy is premised on a national myth of pluralism, not the standard
nationalist invocation of a shared history, a single language and an assimilationist
culture” (Kesavan 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/6943598.stm).
While the challenges that faced Indian leadership in the 1950s 60s and 70s are
still largely the same challenges that face the leadership of 2010, Indian democracy
remains. Despite widespread poverty, illiteracy, significant income inequality, an
imbalance in rural and urban economic development and flares of ethnic violence, the
legitimacy of democratic government in India survives. “The press has remained
vigorous, free and unafraid to challenge the government,” the judiciary remains
autonomous and independent, election turnout continues to rise, India’s party system
continues to function and serve it’s representative function and most importantly,
elections continue unabated, opposition parties frequently win and incumbents peacefully
hand power over to his/her challenger at both the national and state level (Varshney
1998).
India’s history of indirect-direct British colonial rule is in large part responsible
for the consolidation of democracy in post-colonial India. The creation of the Congress
Party in 1885 along with the development of an administrative state infrastructure,
originally designed to serve the interests of the colonial state, provided the necessary
framework for democracy to take root in India. However, while the party system remains
strong, some question the strength of the administrative infrastructure in India. As
democracy has consolidated, and India has experienced increasing levels of mass
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mobilization and political participation, the effectiveness of the Indian state has become
increasingly in doubt (Kohli 2009).
In the next chapter we turn to India’s economic development. Since
Independence, Indian economic leadership has put the state at the center of economic
policy and has pursued a state-led economic development program. Unfortunately,
despite the best of intentions, government intervention in the Indian economy has on the
whole caused harm and not good. Indeed, the most recent “miraculous growth” over the
past two decades has been largely a function of deregulation and privatization. India’s
“miraculous growth” in the 1990s and 2000s is bittersweet: while the high levels of
economic growth are improving the lives of a few, India’s economic development
continues to be narrow and shallow. In the next chapter, the intersection of economic
policy and social policy highlight the relationship between democracy and two different
models of economic growth.
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Chapter 3
Indian Economic Development, 1947-2010
Today, India’s economy is considered one of the fastest growing economies in the
world. Since the late 1990’s, India has experienced an average gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate of over nine percent per year and has achieved the status of one of the
fastest growing economies going into the twenty-first century (CIA World Fact Book,
2009). However, this has not always been the case: only in the past several decades has
the Indian economy taken off. Under British colonial rule, India’s economy was
characterized by “near-stagnation” (Kapila 2009, 31). The poor performance of the
colonial laissez-faire capitalist economic policies acted as a catalyst for change. The
newly independent state recognized the failures of the laissez-faire economic program to
promote economic growth and development in India and pursued a state-led development
program going into the second half of the 20th century.
However, early efforts to achieve higher rates of economic growth via India’s
state-led development program were relatively unsuccessful. The slow growth that
characterized the thirty years following independence came to be known as the “Hindi
growth rate” (Kohli, 2004). The protectionist and interventionist developmental program
that increasingly emphasized socialist economic policy was poorly executed: the gap
between state intentions and capability became clear.
It was not until the 1980s that India began to slowly liberalize its economy and
break ties with its socialist past. By the late 1980s, the Indian economy began to take off,
though the state still played a central role in development planning (Kohli, 2004; Kapila,
2009). High rates of government spending and public investment drove economic growth
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during the 1980s and by 1991, India found itself in a serious balance-of-payments crisis.
The economic crisis of the early 1990s forced India to reevaluate its state-led approach to
economic growth and development. The 1990s were characterized by further
liberalization mixed with a more perfect marriage between the state and business. The
higher growth rates in the 1990s and 2000s can be explained by India’s shift away from
socialist-inspired economic planning towards a pro-business economic program (Kohli,
2007).
Interestingly, the Indian model of development is significantly different than the
traditional model of industrial development. Instead of industry and manufacturing
driving economic growth and development, the service sector has acted as the
modernizing force in India. The past 30 years of strategic economic openness and
protectionism has allowed the service sector, most importantly tradable services, in India
to flourish. India’s service-based model of development indicates a new path to economic
growth and development under democratic rule.
India’s British Colonial Period: Laissez-faire policies and exploitation
Inspired by Smithonian economics, the British colonial state in India pursued
economic growth and development through laissez-faire capitalism. The rationale behind
the pro-market approach was twofold: first, economic openness and competitiveness
were thought to generate “higher rates of production growth via more efficient allocation
of scarce resources” (Kohli 2004, 6). Second, state interventions were thought to cause
“distortions that hurt economic growth” (Kohli 2004, 6). Consequently, the British
colonial government saw it their responsibility to ensure the operation of free-markets
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and the prevention of government induced market distortions. Unfortunately, laissez-faire
policies would prove ineffective at achieving economic growth in India.
In the latter half of the 19th century, India began to feel the changes that
correspond with industrialization. Imports of machine made goods first became available
in the late 1800s (Kapila, 2009). However, the introduction of “machine-made goods
from abroad…reacted adversely on the traditional pattern of economic life, [and] did not
create the impulse for development along new lines” (First Five Year Plan 1951, 28).
Instead of sparking an industrial revolution, the arrival of machine made goods resulted
in the destruction of India’s “traditional arts, crafts and industries” (First Five Year Plan
1951, 28). As a result, productivity plummeted and underemployment increased.
In such an environment there could be little economic or social progress.
…Whatever surpluses were available….were directed to the purchase of imports,
partly of better finished products from abroad and partly of equipment for the new
transportation system designed primarily in the interests of foreign
commerce….Up to the end of the 19th century, the only major large scale
industries which had taken root in the country were textiles. Little attention was
paid to improvement of agriculture or the needs of the rural areas (First Five
Year Plan 1951, 28).
Colonial India was “characterized by a low-tech, low-productivity agrarian
economy” (Kohli 2004, 222). While the British did provide “political unity, a ‘national’
market, and infrastructure,” these were not enough to support economic growth or
industrialization (Kohli 2004, 222). Despite the structural foundations for development
laid by the British, the colonial regime had little influence on the relatively low savings
and investment rates of the domestic population, “primitive technology, and poor
economy with little internal demand” (Kohli 2004, 222).
Britain’s interest in India’s development and industrialization was primarily based
on financial self-interest, characteristic of most colonial relationships. The British regime
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failed to invest in “growth-promoting activities” such as technology development and
“maintained an open economy that could overwhelm any indigenous dynamism that
might have emerged” (Kohli 2004, 222). What is remarkable, despite the considerable
hurdles for a class of industrial entrepreneurs to develop in colonial India, a small group
of capitalists flourished. Upon independence, “these capitalists and India’s nationalist
political elite agreed that rapid future industrialization would require protection and
active state intervention” (Kohli 2004, 223). Upon independence, India began its state-led
development program.
India at Independence: 1947
The newly independent, democratic state of India faced remarkable challenges
following independence. The most significant problems the new state had to address were
mass poverty and widespread illiteracy (as high as 84% in 1947) exacerbated by income
inequalities across regions and groups (Kapila 2009, 32). To combat these largely
economic and social development problems, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru, made it his first priority to improve the standard of living of the Indian population
via a state-led economic development program. From independence, the Indian state
played a central role in economic development planning.
In 1947, the Indian economy was mostly agrarian: nearly 80% of the population
lived in villages and participated in agriculture. However, despite the high percentage of
the population working in agriculture, “the country was not self-sufficient in food and
raw materials for industry” (Kapila 2009, 32). Alleviation of food shortages and Indian
self-sufficiency became of primary importance, encouraging the new state to implement
protectionist and interventionist economic policies. Import substitution industrialization
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(ISI) theory informed India’s early efforts toward economic growth and development (De
Costa, 2006)1.
India implemented a massive state-wide economic planning program and
developed a series of Five Year Plans to lead India down the path of economic growth
and development. According to the First Five Year Plan (FYP):
The central objective of planning in India at the present stage (1951-1956) is to
initiate a process of development which will raise living standards and open out to
the people new opportunities for a rich and more varied life…But the economic
condition of a country at any given time is a product of the broader social
environment, and economic planning has to be viewed as an integral part of a
wider process aiming not merely at the development of resources in a narrow
technical sense, but at the development of human faculties and the building up of
an institutional framework adequate to the needs and aspirations of the people
(1951, Chapter 1).
The plan emphasized the importance of the wellbeing of the Indian people and
saw economic development as a facilitator of improved standards of living. Economic
growth and development were seen as means to an end: a means to protect the
Constitutionally defined “right to work, the right to adequate income, the right to
education and to a measure of insurance against old age, sickness and other disabilities”
(First FYP 1951, Chapter 1). The first FYP approached economic development from a
social perspective. Successful development was defined as that which would not
exacerbate income inequality or the “concentration of wealth and economic power in the
hands of a few” (First FYP 1951, Chapter 1). This commonwealth perspective acted as
the bedrock of socialist tendencies that would take root in India in the following years.

1

ISI is an approach to economic growth and development that limits foreign imports in an effort
to encourage self-sufficiency in the developing state. By limiting imports, domestic industry is supposed to
fill the gap and produce what the economy needs. However, ISI in developing countries is often challenged
by low domestic savings and investment rates, requiring that public investment finance development.
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The first FYP recognized the importance of increasing capital accumulation and
redirecting capital into industry. The traditional model of industrial development helped
shape India’s economic policies in the years following independence. Drawing from the
industrialization experiences of Great Britain, the United States, Japan and the former
Soviet Union, India’s first FYP noted that higher rates of capital formation resulted from
higher levels of net investment which in turn resulted in dramatic increases in national
income (First FYP 1951, Chapter 2).
Of particular interest was the Soviet path to development: state-directed
development by way of public financing and investment (First FYP 1951, Chapter 2).
Early Indian economic policy reflected former Soviet Union economic policy of the
1920s and 1930s. During the 1920s and 1930s, the former Soviet Union dramatically
increased government spending and public investment in an effort to increase
productivity, capital accumulation, and ultimately the national income. India was inspired
by the former Soviet Union’s “deliberate state policy and action” to improve the standard
of living of its people. Soviet investment during the 20s and 30s averaged twenty percent
of national income, resulting in the overall increase of Soviet national income by 130%
(First FYP 1951, Chapter 2).
India was particularly interested in the Soviet path to development for at least two
reasons: first, the Soviet Union played a central role in development as India envisaged
for its own development and second, Soviet industrialization occurred more recently and
was therefore assumed to be a more relevant historical analogy. India’s first FYP
concluded, “It would appear on the whole that, in under developed countries with low
standards of living and rapidly increasing population (characteristics of which are similar
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to both the Soviet Union and India), a rate of growth commensurate with needs cannot be
achieved until the rate of capital formation comes up to around 20 per cent of the national
income” (First FYP 1951, Chapter 2).
Capital formation and investment rates are directly related to domestic savings
rates. In order to increase the rate of capital formation and investment, the rate of
domestic saving must also increase. The most reliable, consistent means to ensure
increased domestic savings rates is for the state to effectively force its people to save
more through taxation or price inflation (First FYP 1951, Chapter 2; see also
Gerschenkron, 1966; Moore, 1966). As national income rises, the more aggressive a
state is in shifting the increase in income to savings as opposed to consumption, the faster
the development process. As such, the First FYP held, “such a programme for stepping
up capital formation calls for sustained austerity” (1951, Chapter 2). The First FYP
predicted that if India could increase its domestic savings rate from five percent to twenty
percent of national income, India could maintain GDP growth around five percent per
year (Kapila, 2009)2. Furthermore, at the target savings rate of twenty percent of national
income, the related problems of low capital accumulation and investment would improve.
In an effort to stimulate economic growth, India allocated Rs. 2069 crores
(equivalent to $44 million USD today) over the period 1951-59 towards its state-led
development program (First FYP 1951, Chapter 4). Public expenditure during this period
targeted both agriculture, in an effort to achieve self-sufficiency and reduce poverty, and
infrastructure, to provide the foundation for industrialization (Five Year Plan 1951,

2

Low savings rates often indicate either (1) a poor domestic population and/or (2) a lack of
investment opportunities and incentives to encourage savings. Unfortunately, both were characteristic of
India in the 1950s.
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Chapter 4). The central role of the state in India’s development program is reflected in the
distribution of public funding toward state owned enterprise versus private enterprise.
…nearly 60 per cent of the planned outlay will result directly in the creation of
productive capital in the ownership of the Central and State Governments; this
will be mainly under irrigation and power, transport and communications, and
industry. The remaining 40 per cent will partly add to productive equipment in the
private sector, partly provide assistance in the form of working capital or of
advisory and administrative services, partly help to maintain and expand social
services, and partly act as an incentive for community effort in development
(First FYP 1951, Chapter 4).
In sum, over the period of the first FYP, India managed to increase national
income by eighteen percent, food grains production increased by twenty percent, cotton
and major oilseeds output increased forty-five and eight percent respectively, and over
six million acres of land were brought under irrigation “through major works; another 10
million … benefited through smaller works” (Second FYP 1956, Chapter 2).
Furthermore, India exceeded its GDP target growth rate of 2.1 % per year for the period.
The actual growth rate achieved for this period was 3.6 %
(http://business.mapsofindia.com/india-planning/first-five-year.html). While the GDP
growth target could be considered modest, it was a sharp improvement over the sluggish
growth rate achieved under colonial rule, which averaged less than one percent per year
between 1900 and 1950, equivalent to population growth (Das 2006)3. To the extent that
India experienced higher than expected GDP growth and a modest increase in national
income, the First FYP was moderately successful in improving India’s standard of living.

3

Because GDP growth was equivalent to population growth, India experienced no increase in per
capita income during this 50 year period.
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Figure 2: The first FYP was effective in increasing both investment and national income.
income
Source: First Five Year Plan, 1954
1954.

The Second FYP: 1956--61
In an effort to build off the modest success of the First FYP, the Second FYP
(1956-61)
61) was considerably more aggressive and “intended to carry forward and
accelerate the process of development initiated in the first plan period” (Second FYP
1956, Chapter 3). The Second FYP aimed to increase national income by 25%,
25 “enlarge
employment opportunities at a rate sufficient to absorb the increase in labor force
consequent on the increase in population…and to take a major stride forward in the
direction of industrialization so as to prepare the ground for more rapid advance
adv
in the
plan periods to come” (Second FYP 1956, Chapter 2). In many ways the second plan was
a continuation of the priorities of the first plan, “but there (was) inevitably a shift in
priorities with a larger accent on industrialization, especially the development of heavy
industry, and the necessary ancillaries like transport” (Second FYP 1956, Chapter 2).
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“The 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution emphasized that the state must play a
progressive role in the development of industries” (Kapila 2009, 41). To achieve higher
rates of economic growth and development, beginning with the Second FYP, the State
began to play an even larger role in the economy.
The adoption of a socialist pattern of society as the national objective, as well as
the need for planned and rapid development, require that all industries of basic
and strategic importance, or in the nature of public utility services, should be in
the public sector…The State has, therefore, to assume direct responsibility for the
future development of industries over a wider area (emphasis added 1956
Industrial Policy Resolution).
Commensurate with the increased role of the state, public expenditure increased
dramatically during this period. The Second FYP allocated Rs. 4800 crores (102.8
Million USD) toward state-led development between 1956 and 1961, a significant
increase over the First FYP budget. As noted earlier, development of heavy industry was
emphasized in spending priorities and increased from 7.6% in the first FYP to 18.5% in
the Second FYP of the allocated development budget (Second FYP 1956, Chapter 2).
Consequently, relative expenditure on agriculture declined (15% in the First FYP to just
under 12% in the Second FYP) (Second FYP 1956, Chapter 2).
The Second FYP proved to be too aggressive and too ambitious. Additionally, the
socialist, import-substitution platform on which the plan was based required the Indian
state to borrow in large quantities from abroad to finance the plan’s programs and
initiatives. The Second FYP was “much more ambitious, much more dependent than its
precursor on borrowing abroad and on deficit finance” and ultimately faced considerable
financial challenges as the state was unable to borrow abroad on a scale commensurate
with the volume of its imports of capital goods” (Bareau, Bird, and Shonfield 1957, 301).
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Public investment during the Second FYP was financed by foreign loans and as
production lagged behind spending, India’s debt grew during this period.
The Third FYP: 1961-66
The principal aims of the Third FYP were to increase national income by 5% per
year, maintain investment to sustain the target growth rate, achieve agriculture selfsufficiency, expand basic industries “so that the requirements of further industrialization
can be met…mainly from the country's own resources,” increase the rate and
opportunities of employment, “and establish progressively greater equality of opportunity
and to bring about reduction in disparities in income and wealth and a more even
distribution of economic power” (Third FYP 1961, Chapter 4). The Third FYP estimated
that if executed properly, “ national income should go up by about 30% and per capita
income by about 17%” over the plan period (Third FYP 1961, Chapter 5). Furthermore,
the Third FYP called for a more “intensive effort” and “greater sense of urgency” than
previous plans, highlighting the need for “the maximum rate of investment that can be
achieved” (Third FYP 1961, Chapter 4).
While agriculture had been largely ignored to this point, the Third FYP placed a
significantly greater emphasis on food grain production in an effort to achieve selfsufficiency. The State was compelled to do whatever it took to achieve the “socialist”
style of living it desired. The projected cost of the Third FYP programs totaled Rs. 8098
crores (about a $174 million USD), over double the expenditure of the Second FYP
(Third FYP 1961, Chapter 5 Annex II). In order to do so, the State borrowed extensively
from foreign sources and India’s balance of payments became of critical concern. The
Third FYP called for an increase in net investment from 11 to 14% of national income.
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Part of the increase in investment was financed by external sources (Third FYP 1961,
Chapter 6). India’s growing reliance on external financing would prove to be a limitation
in further development, as production lagged behind spending.
The principal goal of the first three FYPs was to improve the standard of living of
the Indian population. On most accounts, the first three FYPs were only modestly
successful in this regard. Not only did gross national income remain low, but GDP
remained relatively stagnant and hovered at 3.7% per year between 1950 and 1964 (Kohli
2009). Unfortunately, public investment in all three sectors: infrastructure, agriculture
and industrial development did little to reduce unemployment and increase the supply of
consumer goods. During the same period, industrial growth averaged 7.4% per year,
agricultural growth averaged 3.1% per year and gross investment as a percentage of GDP
averaged 13% per year (Kohli 2009).
Despite the common goal of improving the standard of living for the Indian
population, in practice, the first three FYPs lacked unity in rhetoric and action. According
to Basu, the ideologies behind the first three Plans were competing, if not contradictory
(Basu 2004).
“A soviet-style planning system was developed, but without the state having a
monopoly of control over the resources. Capitalism was allowed to flourish, but a
large bureaucracy was nurtured. Huge investments were made in basic industries,
but at the same time several sectors were protected as belonging to the small-scale
sector. Capitalism was criticized but it was also relied upon. Socialism was never
practiced, but the rhetoric of socialism was the norm. A burgeoning bureaucracy
became the surrogate for socialism” (Basu 2004, 19).
The two decades following independence in India were characterized by the
Nehruvian model of state-led, import substitution industrialization. The Nationalist
movement that occurred leading up to, during, and after independence sparked an
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increased interest in national sovereignty, a belief in the “superiority of the state in
steering progressive capitalist development, and the need for India’s poor to share in the
fruits of development (Kohli 2009). As a result, the nationalist leaders of India were
suspicious of an open economy and, despite low domestic savings rates, were also
unwelcoming to foreign investment. The slow economic growth and unchanging standard
of living for the Indian population during the Nehru era laid the bedrock for the next,
more extreme, wave of socialism as articulated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (196677).
The Fourth FYP: 1969-74
The Indira Gandhi Era was characterized by “economic rhetoric (that) moved
further to the Left, and the gap between the state’s developmental capacities and
economic goals widened even further, to the detriment of industrial development” (Kohli
2009, 121). The Fourth FYP reiterated the goal of improving India’s standard of living,
especially of the poor (Fourth FYP 1969, Preface). The Fourth FYP notes:
“The ‘socialist pattern of society’ means that the basic criterion for determining
lines of advance must not be private profit, but social gain, and that the pattern of
development and the structure of socio-economic relations should be so planned
that they result not only in appreciable increases in national income and
employment but also in greater equality in incomes and wealth (Fourth FYP 1969,
Chapter 1).
The leftward shift in Indira Gandhi’s political rhetoric effectively politicized
industrialization (Kohli, 2009). The food crises of the late 1960s further exacerbated the
problem. An even greater emphasis was placed on agricultural self-sufficiency and less
emphasis was placed on industrial development. Unfortunately, the left-leaning political
orientation of Indira Gandhi’s political campaign “helped neither economic growth nor
redistribution” (Kohli 2009, 122). As characterized by Atul Kohli, this was an era of
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“missed opportunities” (Kohli 2009, 123). “From the mid-1960s on, the global economy
became more open to manufacture exports from developing countries…India…moved in
nearly the opposite direction, becoming more and more obsessed with ‘politics’” (Kohli
2009, 123). In an effort to maintain political legitimacy, Indira Gandhi redirected public
resources for investment aimed at development into special interest groups, hurting
economic growth. Domestic and foreign investors were alienated by the politicization of
development policies, discouraging private investment. The increasing alliance with the
Soviet Union created a greater distance between the Indian economy and those of the
more “dynamic economies” of the West (Kohli 2009, 124).
In sum, the somewhat narrowly defined national goal of economic development
which was solidified under Nehru derailed under Indira Gandhi and economic growth
declined. Between 1965 and 1979, GDP grew at a sluggish 2.9%, down from 3.7% under
Nehru. Industrial growth averaged only 3.8% compared to 7.4% during the Nehru era.
Agricultural growth, despite being a major focus of the Indira Gandhi economic plan,
decreased from 3.1% under Nehru to 2.3% under Indira Gandhi. The little progress that
was achieved under Nehru was largely erased by Indira Gandhi. More importantly, by
further institutionalizing the import-substitution economic policy, India failed to take
advantage of its “key resource:” cheap labor (Kohli 2009, 128). When the global
economy was becoming more global, India retracted from the international economy and
consequently was not able to take advantage of export-led growth like other, more open,
export-oriented developing countries. Going into the 1980s, India’s economic outlook
looked similar to that immediately following independence.
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Economic Progress 1980-1990: Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth FYPs
The ISI inspired economic restrictions of the 1960s and 1970s were gradually
relaxed in the 1980s (DeCosta 2006). The Sixth FYP aimed to achieve a target GDP
growth rate of 5.2% per year. To do so, the projected public outlay increased
dramatically. The Sixth FYP called for Rs. 97,500 crores (about $2.1 Billion USD) in
public expenditure to finance the development effort. The Sixth plan increased public
expenditure on development over 80% compared to the fifth plan (Sixth FYP 1980,
preface).
The election of Rajiv Gandhi and the development of the Sixth Plan marked
India’s departure from a uniformly ISI informed economic policy towards an exportoriented approach to development, allowing a closer alliance between the state and
private business (Kohli 2007). The Sixth FYP draws a distinction between self-reliance
and self –sufficiency, determining that self-sufficiency, being able to pay state debts, is
all that is required to be independent. The Sixth FYP called for increased growth in
exports and selective protection of industries in which India had a comparative advantage
(Sixth FYP 1980, Preface).
The Sixth plan demonstrates the shift in Indian economic policy following the
Indira Gandhi era. India now aimed to promote exports, and strategically protect its
indigenous industries in which it had a comparative advantage. This required a more
intimate alliance between the state and business (Kohli 2009). India’s economic policy
would develop into a state-led pro-business approach to economic growth and
development. This shift in policy and attitude would be the foundation for India’s
economic growth in the next three decades.
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Table 1:
Targeted and Actual Growth Rates under India's FYPs

Target Actual

Growth Rate For

First Plan

2.1

3.6

National Income

Second Plan

4.5

4.0

National Income

Third Plan

5.6

2.2

National Income

Fourth Plan

5.7

3.3

Net Domestic Product

Fifth Plan

4.4

5.2

Gross Domestic Product

As indicated in Table 1, the gap between India’s targeted rates of growth and
actual growth rates revealed the gap between state interests and state capabilities. One of
the best practices Indian leadership gleaned from the First through Fifth plans was the
centrality of public investment in driving growth. The Sixth FYP concluded that if
executed properly, India could increase the rate of capital formation from 21.5% of GNP
in 1979 to 25% over the plan period. Additionally, the Sixth FYP projected that the rate
of investment would stabilize around 27% by the end of the plan and that the economy
would grow (GDP) at about 5.5% per year over the next 10 years. India also expected to
“achieve a modest surplus in balance of payments by 1994-95 (Sixth FYP 1980, Chapter
1).
The Sixth FYP was relatively successful. It met its target GDP growth rate of
5.2% per year over the five-year period. However, the mining and manufacturing
industries underperformed during this period, and agriculture and services over
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performed. Growth in the service sector was credited for helping the Sixth plan meet its
target GDP growth rate (Seventh FYP 1985, Vol I)4.
Seventh FYP 1985-90
The Seventh plan was cognizant of India’s growing balance of payments problem
as a result of the increased reliance on external borrowing to finance development
(Seventh FYP 1985, Vol I). While continued external borrowing was necessary, the
Seventh FYP also aimed to increase net savings by 2% over the period to an average of
just under 25% per year in an effort to offset the need for external financing (Seventh
FYP 1985, Vol I). Given this target savings rate, the Seventh FYP projected that total
borrowings would amount to Rs. 20,000 crores (or about $428 million USD) over the
plan period (Seventh FYP 1985, Vol I). “The process of structural adjustment to
strengthen the balance of payments undertaken in the Sixth Plan period will thus need to
be intensified in order to forestall the equally undesirable alternative outcomes during the
second half of 1980s, namely, excessive external indebtedness or slowing down of
growth due to import shortages” (Seventh FYP 1985, Vol I).
While the Seventh FYP faced significant challenges, it produced an average GDP
growth rate of close to 7.6% by the end of the plan period (Panagariya 2004). By 1985,
the “pace of reform picked up significantly” (Panagariya 2004, 14). According to Joshi
and Little, the growth in exports can be attributed Rajiv Gandhi’s “quasi-Southeast Asian
style” reforms (Joshi and Little 1994, 184). Of particular importance, the 1985 budget
made revenue from exported goods income tax deductible and relaxed indigenous value-

4

A robust discussion of the service sector is provided in Chapter 4.
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added requirements on exports, making India much more business friendly (Joshi and
Little, 1994).
Unfortunately, the 1980 reforms were heavily financed by deficit spending. The
literature recognizes “the role of reforms but regard fiscal expansion financed by external
and internal borrowing as the key to the acceleration of growth during the 1980s”
(Panagariya 2004, 6). Panagariya demonstrates that the growth in the 1980s was fragile
and variable and ultimately unsustainable due to the dependence on internal and external
financing (2004). DeLong argues that while Rajiv Gandhi did implement necessary
reforms, the true significance was attitudinal:
Under Rajiv Gandhi, the government made some tentative moves to encourage
capital-goods imports, relax industrial regulations, and rationalize the tax system.
The consequence was an economic boom incommensurate with the modesty of
the reforms...The change in official attitudes in the 1980s, towards encouraging
rather than discouraging entrepreneurial activities and integration into the world
economy, and a belief that the rules of the economic game had changed for good
may have had a bigger impact on growth than any specific policy reforms
(DeLong 2003, 3-4).
While the attitudinal change should not be understated, the effect of the economic
reforms during this period should also not be understated. The reforms of the 1980s,
while “limited in scope and without a clear road map” gave Indian politicians the
confidence needed to continue down the more liberal path of development (Panagariya
2004, 5). However, the balance of payments problem that began in the 1980s ultimately
culminated in India’s financial crisis in 1991 (Ahluwalia, 2002; Joshi and Little, 1994;
Panagariya, 2004).
The 1991 balance of payments crisis forced India to procure a $1.8 billion IMF
loan and acted as a “tipping point” in India’s economic history. The IMF bailout
wounded the pride of a country that had strove above all for self-sufficiency
through its post-independence socialist policies. The bailout announced to Indian
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policymakers and the world the country’s policy failures (University of Chicago
Task Force Report 2006, 7).
1990 Economic Reforms
Role of State Planning: The 1991 foreign exchange reserve crisis forced Indian
leadership to reevaluate the role of government planning and action in economic growth
and development. While the 1980s reforms were successful in increasing GDP growth
rates, public investment drove GDP growth rates. One of the main lessons India learned
during the 1980s was that economic growth is not sustainable when supported primarily
by government spending and public investment.
The reform period of the 1990s was characterized by strategy to “improve the
efficiency of the economy and the international competitiveness of the industrial sector
by dismantling quantitative restrictions which crippled the capacity of the (public sector
enterprises) and of the economy to grow” (Chai and Roy 2006, 26)5. Specifically, public
sector enterprises were made more efficient by “forcing them to operate more like private
sector enterprises, to face international competition, to disinvest a certain portion of their
capital which [was] not earning reasonable returns or making losses, and to reduce the
size of overstaffing” (Chai and Roy 2006 26).
The 1991 reforms finally “allowed India’s integration into the global economy —
and laid the groundwork for the high growth of today” (Das 2006). Manmohan Singh,
current Prime Minister of India, led the 1990s reform movement as the then Finance
Minister. His reforms included lowering tariffs and other trade barriers, eliminating staterequired industrial licensing, lowering taxes, devaluing the rupee, encouraging foreign
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An example of quantitative restrictions would be limits on imports of technological goods or
indigenous value-added requirements.
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investment and reducing currency controls (Das 2006). The economy immediately
responded and GDP growth during this period rose to averages between 6 and 7% per
year, “inflation plummeted and exports and currency reserves shot up” (Das 2006). What
is remarkable about India’s growth in the 1990s and beyond is its foundation in the
service sector. India presents a new model of service led growth that is promising for
other late developing, democratic states. The next chapter explores the relationship
between democracy and service-led growth.
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Chapter 4
Democracy and Service Sector Led Economic Growth
As the previous two chapters have indicated, democracy in India has remained
relatively constant since independence while India’s economy, aside from the past two
decades, has underperformed. Indian economic theory during the first four decades
following independence reflected a dedication to the traditional model of traditional
industrialization. The Indian case provides evidence for the claim that late traditional
industrialization is unlikely to be successful in a democratic regime. However,
democracy is, in large part, responsible for India’s recent high rates of economic growth.
India’s new model of service-led growth depends on democratic governance and
democratic norms and values.
The Indian case is unique for two reasons: first, India has achieved remarkable
rates of economic growth despite being a democracy and second, it has done so with a
new model of service sector led development. This chapter argues that there is a
relationship between democratic development and India’s service sector model of
economic growth. Many students of Indian economy have highlighted the uniqueness of
India’s service-led model of economic growth; however, none acknowledge the
important significance of India’s democratic regime type. This chapter concludes by
arguing that India’s miraculous growth over the past two decades has been a function of
the compatibility of Indian democracy and service-led growth models of development.
India’s 1991 economic reforms, the relative importance of capital accumulation in the
service sector, India’s comparative advantage in skilled labor, the increase in
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international demand for tradable services and the necessity of political openness to foster
service led growth explain India’s services revolution.
The following chapter explores the relationship between democracy and serviceled development. First, a brief literature review on development models is presented.
Second, possible explanations for the failure of traditional industrialization in India are
explored. Third, explanations for India’s successful service-led growth model are
presented. Finally, the chapter concludes by anticipating the sustainability of India’s new
model of service led growth and makes recommendations to increase the likelihood of
future growth.
Democracy and Development
An analysis of the democracy-development relationship can take two forms
depending on which is defined as the independent or dependent variable. Defining
economic development as the dependent variable and democracy as the independent
variable requires the hypothesis that higher or lower levels of democracy will “cause”
higher or lower levels of economic development. The goal in this research design is to
explain variation in economic development based on changes in regime type. The
direction of the relationship is assumed: regime type “causes” economic development, at
least to some degree. Alternatively, defining democracy as the dependent variable and
economic development as the independent variable implies a hypothesis that higher or
lower levels of economic development will cause higher or lower levels of democracy. In
this research design, the goal is to explain variation in democracy based on changes in the
level of economic development.
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There is no shortage of literature on the democracy-development relationship but
to date, no consensus has been reached as to the exact specification and direction of the
relationship. For example, some students of democracy and economic development “see
democracy as an effective tool for safeguarding the private sphere, maximizing economic
freedom, stimulating investment, and allowing for the most efficient use of resources”
(Baum and Lake 2003, 334). This theoretical orientation names democracy the
independent variable, economic development the dependent variable. Here, democracy is
argued to be “good” for economic development because it protects the market from
government intervention which may negatively impact economic growth.
The alternate theoretical perspective argues the opposite, that democracy may not
be “good” for economic development but rather that autocracy, not democracy, best
promotes economic growth (Baum and Lake, 2003). According to this theoretical
perspective, the process of economic development by way of industrialization in late
developing states requires the state to encourage rapid urbanization and modernization of
the population. The state-led effort often results in massive societal upheaval. Therefore,
“autocrats are both better able to resist (populist) demands and, indeed, to suppress labor
unions, wages, and consumer demands” (Baum and Lake 2003, 334). The assumption is
that autocratic regime types are better able to narrowly define their goals and interests. If
an autocracy narrowly defines its interest in terms of economic development, it is better
suited than a democracy (which theoretically is more responsive to citizen demands) to
ignore citizen demands for social welfare programs that could potentially cause growth
stagnation and threaten the state’s primary goal of economic development. Barrington
Moore echoes this argument and claims that “a strong conservative government has
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distinct advantages” as compared to a more liberal democratic government during
economic development (Moore 1966, 441). Strong authoritative government is better able
to suppress the lower classes, those that typically foot the bill and suffer the most from
economic development (Deutsch 1961; Moore 1966).
There are several explanations for a democratic regime’s inefficiency and
ineffectiveness in achieving high rates of economic growth and development. First,
democracies may not be politically and institutionally strong enough to force its citizens
through the industrialization process without losing political legitimacy and support,
ultimately resulting in the political failure of leadership and an abandoned effort at
economic growth and development. This explanation assumes that the state is required to
achieve late economic growth and development. Accordingly, the laissez-faire, noninterventionist democratic approach to late economic growth and development may fail
because the state is needed, at least to a degree, to jumpstart the development process
(Kohli 2004). The laissez-faire approach, while successful in early developers like the
United States and Great Britain (Gerschenkron 1966), is ineffective today. Late economic
development must happen faster, over a period of years not centuries, which requires the
state to coordinate and orchestrate development efforts (Gerschenkron 1966; Kohli
2004).
Higher levels of democracy in a developing state may actually negatively impact
economic development, leading to state instability and the overall failure of both
economic development and the consolidation of democracy. This assertion prompted
Lipset to reverse the direction of the democracy-development relationship when he
defined democracy as the dependent variable and economic development the independent
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variable (1959). Lipset, argued a “threshold approach” to economic development under
autocratic rule (1959). He argues, “If other countries become as rich as the economically
advanced nations, it is highly probable that they will become political democracies… the
sequence of events one would expect is one of poor authoritarian countries developing
and becoming democratic once they reach some level of development …” (Przeworski
1997, 158). The idea is that higher per capita income will allow the population to have
more leisure time and participate more in politics which will increase the demand for
democratic representation.
However, while participation and activism may be good for democratic
consolidation (Almond and Verba, 1965), it has also been argued that mass political
mobilization can have a destabilizing effect on a state if the proper institutions are not in
place to handle the increase in popular activity. For example, a prominent argument in the
literature suggests that economic development does not promote democracy
(Gerschenkron 1966; Huntington 1968).
In developing countries of today…the increasingly ineffective and unpopular
traditional authorities cannot be replaced successfully by their historic successors
in the Western world, the classic institutions of 18th and 19th century liberalism
and laissez-faire. For the uprooted, impoverished and disoriented masses
produced by social mobilization [as a result of economic development], it is
surely untrue that the government is best that governs least. [Late developers] are
far more likely to need a direct transition from traditional government to the
essentials of a modern welfare state (Deutsch 1961, 498).
Major changes in regime type and economic orientation have huge ripple effects
on society (Huntington 1968). Countries undergoing economic development require
social institutions, programs, and policies that intervene in the development process to
mitigate some of the harsher effects of economic growth (Deutsch 1961).
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In a compelling discussion of democracy and economic development, Kohli
argues that late development efforts tend to become unfocused when various interest
groups have access to the political process and as a result, the goal of economic
development and growth tends to derail (Kohli 2004). Kohli finds in his comparative case
study of four late developers (Brazil, Korea, India and Nigeria) that states in which
leaders are less dependent on popular support and legitimacy to remain in office are
better suited to effectively pursue economic development. In a democracy, the need for
popular support to remain in office prevents leaders from narrowly defining their goals,
as they are subject to the demands of multiple groups in society, often with conflicting
interests. In “fragmented multi-class states” (similar to democracies), “a public arena
within them is often well enough established that leaders are held accountable for poor
public policies and performance” (Kohli 2004, 11). During economic development, it is
likely that the public perception of policy choices designed to achieve higher rates of
economic growth may be negative and could potentially be politically costly. Conversely,
in autocratic or “cohesive-capitalist states” where authority is centralized and often not
based on public support, narrowly defining the state’s interest in terms of economic
development and growth is in many ways easier because autocrats are not dependent on
their citizens for legitimacy and political support. For Kohli, the relationship between
democracy and late economic development tends to be negative.
The literature suggests that the relationship between democracy and development,
depending on the context, can be both positive and/or negative. These results suggest that
the relationship between democracy and development remains underspecified and that
perhaps the relationship is not unidirectional but rather reciprocal and possibly contingent
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upon interaction with other variables. The purpose of this thesis is not to explain the
relationship between regime type and economic development across all time and place.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the unique Indian case where democracy precedes
high rates of economic growth and development. Lessons from the Indian case could
potentially be quite valuable in light of the increasing democratization of states
worldwide and for other late developers. While it is inappropriate to draw large
generalizations from a single case study, it is possible to gain interesting insights into the
unique character of democratic economic growth and development.
The historical record demonstrates that economic growth and development efforts
have largely been pursued under non-democratic regime types and the effectiveness of
these efforts have been mixed. India presents a puzzle in that it has been an electoral
democracy since its independence from Great Britain in 1947 and while it has achieved
miraculous growth rates over the past two decades, on the whole, the Indian economy has
underperformed. The first four decades of Indian independence appeared to provide
evidence in support of the argument that democracy is “bad” for economic development.
However, since the 1990s, India’s economy has taken off and today is one of the top
performing economies in the world. What explains India’s stagnant economic growth
during the first four decades of independence? What explains India’s miraculous growth
in the 1990s through today? Why has economic development in India been both narrow
and shallow? How has India’s democratic regime type impacted Indian economic
development?
These following sections explore the relationship between democracy and
economic development in India. I argue that democracy has been both a blessing and a
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curse for Indian development. India’s democratic regime type explains, at least in part,
the high rates of economic growth in the 1990s for its relationship with service sector led
development. However, India’s democratic regime type has also been a curse in that it is
largely responsible for India’s narrow economic development: democracy has prevented
traditional industrialization from taking place. I argue that in order for India to sustain
high rates of economic growth in the future, India must (1) create more jobs in the service
sector to correct the imbalance between service sector employment and service sector
contribution to GDP; (2) build off the success of India’s service-led model of
development and increase capital investment in manufacturing to diversify its economic
base, and (3) increase education expenditure in an effort to increase employment
opportunities for more of the population and simultaneously decrease the number of
people living below the poverty line.
India and Traditional Industrialization
Two factors contributed to India’s inability to undergo traditional
industrialization: the impact of British colonial economic policy and India’s democratic
regime type following independence.
Before the Industrial Revolution, India accounted for a quarter of [the] world’s
industrial output. The exports consisted chiefly of manufacture like cotton and
silk fabrics, calicoes, artistic ware, silk and woolen cloth. The impact of the
British rule and the Industrial Revolution led to the decay of Indian handicrafts.
Machine-made goods started pouring in to the country. The decline of handicrafts
was not followed by the rise of modern industry in India because of the British
policy of encouraging the import of manufactures and export of raw materials
from India...One thing was quite obvious that during the British period, no effort
was made to foster the development of capital goods industries (Kapila 2009,
317).
Upon independence, in response to the British colonial period, one of India’s top
priorities was to foster economic growth and development through state-led development
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planning (see chapter 2). India’s state-led development program can be attributed, at least
in part, to “the socialistic leanings of some of the founding fathers of the country” (Kapila
2009, 319). In reaction to the laissez-faire economic policy of the British colonial period,
post-colonial Indian leadership emphasized the importance of Indian self-sufficiency and
sustainability. The ISI program that was put in place acted as a barrier to entrepreneurial
activity. Most notably, India’s licensing requirements for new and existing businesses
acted as a huge barrier to economic growth (Kapila 2009). The ISI program suffered from
bureaucratic inefficiency and ineffectiveness, negatively contributing to India’s economic
growth.
In addition to bureaucratic inefficiency and ineffectiveness, India’s democratic
regime type also acted as a barrier to economic growth and development. Following the
work of Atul Kohli, I argue that Indian democratic leadership was not able to narrowly
define India’s interest in terms of economic growth and development as a consequence of
the large poverty lobby in Indian society. India’s considerable population living below
the poverty line demanded political recognition and attention. The poverty lobby
prevented Indian leadership from narrowly defining the state interest in terms of
economic growth and development, which is conventionally understood to be a
prerequisite for achieving rapid late-economic growth and development (Kohli 2004).
Instead of focusing all resources on the accumulation of industrial capital, Indian political
leaders, dependent on popular support to maintain legitimacy, were forced to allocate
resources to social programs to alleviate poverty.
Additionally, according to the conventional wisdom of the late development
literature, rapid economic and social transformation of society from traditional to modern
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is required to make the giant leap from an agrarian to industrial economy. Democratic
accountability again acted as a barrier to making these large societal and political changes
because the policies required to achieve these changes are often politically unpopular and
result in civilian hardship.
Modern factory industry requires methods of organizing productive activity that
are significantly different from those employed in preindustrial societies. If the
shift from traditional modes of production to industrial technology is to be
successful, it is necessary to mobilize a labor force which will serve the
necessities of this novel situation. Labor must somehow be drawn out of the old
and transferred into the new environment. It must be given new tasks and
sufficient training to perform them; it must be taught to work to a different pattern
of rules and relationships. Scholars have tended to stress the radical character of
this transformation and the difficulties of its achievement. For example, it has
been the claim of students of the subject that during the past century Indian
industrialization was inhibited in many ways by the tenacious persistence of
commitments to the traditional social order in the countryside....It is argued that
the institutions of the older social order seriously inhibited the creation of an
industrial labor force. Claims of kinship, caste, and village supposedly served as
bonds keeping people on the land or operated as powerful forces to bring them
back (Morris 1965, 198).
During traditional industrialization, the population is forced to transform itself
from a traditional agrarian subsistence economy to a modern industrial economy. The
most challenging aspects for the population undergoing industrialization are urbanization
and the specialization and diversification of the labor force. Urbanization requires the
social reorganization of society from the rural countryside to cities which has profound
effects on the cultural organization of groups in society (Morris 1965). Specialization and
diversification of the labor force requires a sometimes costly transition that requires the
individual worker to choose a single profession, often associated with working in
factories. The transition from subsistence living to high-productivity surplus living
requires dramatic changes in lifestyle. Ultimately, India’s representative government was
incapable of breaking the “traditional social order of the countryside” and “forcing” its
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population through the tough process of industrialization. As a result, India’s economy
remained relatively stagnant through the 1980s.
India’s Model of Service Sector Led Growth
What makes the Indian case unique is the dramatic growth of its economy in the
1990s through today. Despite the British colonial legacy of economic exploitation and
despite its democratic regime type, India’s deregulation and increased openness to trade
in the early 1990s resulted in the miraculous expansion of its economy led by the service
sector. “The emergence of services as the most dynamic sector in the Indian economy
has, in many ways, been a revolution. The most visible and well-known dimension of the
take-off in services has been in software and IT enabled services (including call centres,
design and business process outsourcing)” (Kapila 2009, 470).
What is interesting about India’s model of service sector led economic growth and
development is that India appears to have skipped the step of traditional industrialization
and made the giant leap to a service-based economy. The India model of development
challenges the traditional model of development where agriculture is replaced by industry
which is eventually replaced by services. “Thus, India seems to be an aberration in terms
of the service sector having a much greater role in its economy than in other countries at
similar or even higher levels of income” (Kapila 2009, 471). “India has sidestepped the
manufacturing sector, and made the big leap straight from agriculture into
services...Despite being a low income region, India...[has] adopted the growth pattern of
middle and high income countries” (Ghani 2010,
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4673).
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Figure 4: This figure depicts India's rising share in Services from 1960 to 2008. It demonstrates that
although India is classified as a developing country, India's market sectors are distributed like that of
a developed country. Source: World Bank.

The 1991 Economic Reforms
India’s liberalizing economic reforms of 1991 are arguably the single most
important contributing factor to the services revolution. Reforms in the industrial sector
stimulated internal industrial demand for producer services and “liberalization of the
financial sector provided an environment for faster growth of the financial services”
(Kapila 2009, 484). India’s opening of its economy contributed significantly to service
sector growth. “Evidence suggests that services that have been liberalized most have
53

typically experienced higher growth rates. Areas such as business services (mainly IT and
IT-enabled services), communication, banking and insurance, which have been
liberalized, have exhibited higher growth rates, with wider efficiency and growth benefits
to the rest of the economy. On the other hand, services where there has been limited
opening, like air transport, legal and real-estate services have grown much more slowly,
with likely adverse effects on economy-wide competitiveness and growth performance”
(Kapila 2009, 490; see also Chandra, 2007). India’s balance of payments crisis in 1991
appears to have been a blessing in disguise, for without the crisis, it is likely that India
would have continued to slowly open its economy to international trade as it had been
through the 1980s. However, it is clear that the dramatic liberalizing reforms of 1991
deserve significant credit for the services revolution of the 1990s and 2000s, though the
liberalizing reforms in IT and IT-enabled services appear to be nothing more than a
wonderfully successful historical accident.
The Relative Importance of Capital Accumulation in Services
In addition to liberalizing reforms which opened the Indian economy to increases
in service sector productivity, another explanation for the success of India’s service
sector led development model is that the service sector is different, and in important
ways, from the manufacturing and industrial sectors. Most importantly, the service sector
differs from the industrial and manufacturing sector in demand and supply side factors
that contribute to economic growth.
There is a basic difference in the operation of demand and supply side factors in
driving economy-wide and sectoral growth. According to the mainstream
consensus in macroeconomics, demand factors are predominant in governing the
short-term growth of an economy; but in the long run growth is governed entirely
by supply side factors like capital accumulation (including investment in human
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capital), growth of labour, and technical progress, endogenous or exogenous
(Rakshit 2008, 113-114).
The importance of capital accumulation for traditional industrialization and
ultimately long run growth, as explained above, is what prevented India from achieving
manufacturing and industrial led economic growth during the first several decades
following independence. To experience growth in the service sector, less capital
accumulation is required, making the service led growth model a better fit for India’s
democratic, representative government (Rakshit 2008; Reder 1941).
What makes industrial and manufacturing led growth challenging for democratic
populations is the need for significant capital accumulation in a relatively short period of
time. For manufacturing and industry led development, high rates of capital
accumulation must be achieved in order to experience high rates of economic growth. To
accumulate manufacturing and industrial capital, it is necessary for states to introduce
politically unpopular, severe austerity measures to increase domestic (both public and
private) savings, decrease domestic consumption, and increase domestic (both public and
private) investment in industrial and manufacturing capital. These austerity measures
tend to depress the national living standard for a period until higher manufacturing and
industrial sector productivity is achieved. Because the service sector is less capital
intensive, a service led model of development requires less severe austerity measures and
therefore is a better development model for representative governments like democracies.
The fact that services are in general much less capital intensive and many of
them were relatively new implied that unlike industries, burdened with large,
outmoded and inefficient capital equipment and catering to a sheltered domestic
market in the pre- reforms [pre 1991] period, it was much easier for the services
sector entrepreneurs to switch over to or adopt the most efficient technology and
organizational structure, and focus on economizing cost as well as on the quality
and timely delivery of their products in a fiercely competitive environment.
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Again, in view of the relatively low financial requirement of the [service] sector
capital, market imperfections did not cause insurmountable hurdles for
entrepreneurs, new or old, to move quickly to their optimal scale of operation and
adjust their production in line with changing market conditions (Rakshit 2008,
111-113).
International Increase in Demand for Tradable Services
The international increase in demand for tradable services also deserves partial
credit for India’s services revolution (Gordon and Gupta 2004; Jensen and Kletzer 2005).
The convergence of India’s liberalizing reforms and increasing openness to international
trade with the international increase in demand for tradable services can be described as
nothing but historical accident. And what a miraculous historical accident it was.
Traditionally, services were not considered tradable goods (Banga 2005). However,
international trade in services has grown dramatically since the early 1990s (Banga
2005). While conventional wisdom on service industry growth holds that service sector
growth is predominantly driven by increases in public consumption, India’s services
revolution was driven by external international demand (Banga 2005; Kapila 2009;
Rakshit 2008). “Indeed, emergence of foreign demand as a major source of services
growth constitutes perhaps the most striking feature of India’s macroeconomy over the
last decade” (Rakshit 2008, 104). International demand for tradable services increased as
India’s service sector began to boom and is responsible, at least in part, for India’s
miraculous service led economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s.
India’s Comparative Advantage: Skilled Labor
Another significant contributor to the success of India’s service led growth model
of development is India’s comparative advantage in skilled labor. India’s “huge labour
endowment, varied skill sets and low-cost but quality manpower” has made India one of
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the largest destinations for business process outsourcing, foreign direct investment and
ultimately one of the largest exporters of tradable services (Kapila 2009, 494). Service
industry giants in internet technology, communications, and software industries have
responded to the global increase in demand for tradable services by expanding their
international footprint and increasing business process outsourcing and foreign direct
investment (FDI) abroad (World Investment Report 2009). India has been and continues
to be at the top of the list of places to invest because of its highly skilled, inexpensive,
English speaking, educated labor force (Kapila 2009). “India has one of the largest pools
of low-cost, English speaking, scientific and technical talent. This makes India one of the
obvious choices” for business process outsourcing. Well known companies like “Dell,
Sun Microsystems, LG, Ford, GE and Oracle have announced plans to scale up their
operations in India. Others like American Express, IBM and British Airways are
leveraging the cost advantages India has to offer [by] setting up call centres [in India].
Several foreign airlines and banks have [also] set up business process operations in India”
(BPO India 2010, http://www.bpoindia.org/about/intro.shtml).
India’s comparative advantage in skilled labor has made India one of the most
popular destinations for business process outsourcing and foreign direct investment,
contributing to the overall success and growth of India’s service sector. “The faster
growing services activities seem to be more intensive in skilled labour, with which India
is well endowed” (Kapila 2009, 483). “Within the services exports, rising prominence of
business services reflects the high skill intensity of the Indian workforce...The growing
role of software and business services in India’s service sector exports reflects India’s
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comparative advantage in skill and knowledge-intensive labour based services” (Kapila
2009, 485-487; see also Reder 1941).
Political Openness and Service Sector Growth
Finally, the most critical contributing variable to the success of India’s new model
of service led growth appears to be that it is a democracy. Democracies tend to be more
politically open societies which have higher respect for individual and civil liberties such
as free speech (Hathaway 2003; Neumayer 1999). Information technology,
communications, and software services are unlikely to flourish in relatively restricted and
closed societies that do not allow the free flow of information and opinion. Democracies
are likely to be a more friendly environment than non-democracies for the successful
execution of service-led models of development to the extent democracies are better
promoters of free speech and the free flow of communication and opinion. The liberal
norms and values of “individual rights, the free market, and political democracy” provide
the friendly environment for service sector growth (Gilpin 2001).
An interesting direction for future study would be an analysis of political
openness and an evaluation of the extent to which liberal norms dominate in Indian
society during the 1990s and beyond, as compared to the 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s. If it
could be shown that liberal values and norms become more concrete or “deeper” in
society during the 1990s and beyond, it would provide support for the claim that
normatively, democracies provide good environments for the successful execution of
service-led models of development.
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Is India’s Service Model of Development Sustainable?
In 2009, India’s GDP was $3.6 trillion USD making it the fifth largest economy
in the world (CIA World Fact Book, 2010). It is widely accepted that the service sector
has and continues to drive Indian economic growth. However, many students of the
Indian economy question the sustainability of India’s service led model of development
primarily because of the imbalance between the service sector contribution to GDP and
the percent of India’s labor force employed in services. In 2009, services contributed over
50% to India’s GDP but only 30% of India’s labor force was employed in the service
sector (see above graph). “Despite high growth, labour absorption in services has been
abysmally small” (Rakshit 2008, 91). Indeed, “It is found that growth in the service
sector has been lopsided and jobless. Some sectors have witnessed a double digit growth
rate in the last decade, e.g., communication and business services, while some have
experienced a fall in their growth rates, e.g., railways, real estate and dwellings. The
sectors that have witnessed negative growth rates and those that have experienced slow
growth rates are also the sectors that have large potential for generating employment,
e.g., construction, transport and professional services. Rising labour productivity in the
faster growing sectors has further reduced the scope for increasing employment in these
sectors” (Banga 2005, 30-31).
In many ways, India’s services revolution has been bitter sweet. The high
productivity, high growth services are driving GDP growth in India but doing little to
address India’s “growing crisis of governability” (Kohli 1990). Despite having one of the
world’s largest GDPs, India ranks 164th in income per capita. Poverty and un- and
underemployment remain huge problems. Unfortunately, growth in the service sector has
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done little to improve either. In order to sustain economic growth, and stable democracy,
India must find a way to incorporate a larger portion of the population in the modern
economy. To do so, India must expand job opportunities in both services and
manufacturing. “To resolve the problem of lack of employment growth in services, there
is a need to achieve uniformity in the growth of different services” (Banga 2005, 31). To
improve the sustainability of its service led model of development, India must increase
investment and encourage growth in the slower growing services that have large potential
for generating employment. Additionally, India must expand its economic base and
encourage the development of traditional manufacturing and industrial sectors. These
sectors are important to support because they generate job creation. Certainly, “The
revealed comparative advantage of services does not imply that industry and agriculture
should play a minor role in the development process or that the government should adopt
a hands-off policy in respect of sectoral allocation of resources” (Rakshit 2008, 91). India
must use its service sector success to generate spill over and splintering effects into the
rest of the economy in order to maintain its recent high rates of economic growth (for
more on splintering see Gordon and Gupta 2004).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to explore the relationship between democracy and
economic growth and development. Chapter two argued that the consolidation of Indian
democracy is both a function of its British colonial past and its incredible demographic
diversity. The British colonial period in India can be credited with the development of
India’s Congress party, the pluralistic, “One India” party that identifies members based
on national heritage not based on religious or ethnic heritage. The Congress party
contributed greatly to the consolidation of democracy in India following independence as
it provided the social structure for maintaining elections and establishing political
legitimacy. Furthermore, British colonial rule can be credited with imbuing in Indian
society the democratic norms of political representation and voting, along with the liberal
norms of tolerance, individualism, and education.
Democratic consolidation in India is also a function of India’s incredible
demographic diversity. With so many different linguistic, ethnic, and socioeconomic
groups in India, it continues to be impossible for any one group to dominate all others.
Consequently, democracy is the best form of governance in Indian society as it allows for
peaceful dispute resolution and access to government through political representation for
all groups in society.
In chapters three and four, it has been argued that democracy has been both a
blessing and a curse for Indian economic development: Indian democracy has prevented
traditional industrialization and is responsible for nearly four decades of stagnant
economic growth but is also responsible for creating a friendly environment for India’s
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services revolution and the two most recent decades of miraculous growth. The presence
of various powerful interest groups in India prevented Indian leaders, dependent on
popular support for political legitimacy, from narrowly defining the country’s interest in
terms of economic growth immediately following independence. The poverty lobby in
India effectively prevented traditional industrialization from taking place during the first
four decades of independence because of its demands for social spending.
Interestingly, the relationship between democracy and traditional industrialization
and democracy and service-led growth are different. Democracy is the critical variable
which allowed India to experience the past two decades of explosive economic growth.
Democratic regimes appear to be a good environment for India’s new model of serviceled growth to the extent they embrace liberal values of free speech and the free flow of
information.
Finally, it is important to assess the generalizability of the Indian model of
service-led growth. First, and most obviously, India’s service-led model of development
is most relevant for strong democracies in pursuit of rapid, late economic growth and
development. The number of strong, consolidated undeveloped democracies is relative
few (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). However, because democratic regimes are becoming
more and more common (Marshall and Jaggers 2010), a model of development which
promises high growth under democratic rule is promising for the future development of
young democracies. The India model of development may apply to these young
democracies as they undergo democratic consolidation.
Second, the Indian case demonstrates that a country must possess a comparative
advantage in skilled labor for effective implementation of India’s service-led growth
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model of development. India’s workforce is what makes India unique. While the
percentage of people working in services is frighteningly low, India’s comparative
advantage in skilled, English speaking and urban labor made India ripe for
communications and technology outsourcing, the catalyst of India’s services revolution.
The Indian case suggests that in order for a service model of development to be effective,
it is necessary to have a decent size educated and skilled labor force.
In summary, the India model of service-led growth is unique. While it offers some
promise of generalizability, future research is necessary to assess the extent to which the
India model can be applied elsewhere. Furthermore, future work needs to be done to
determine the sustainability of India’s service-led model of development to determine if
the traditional trajectory of development can be rewritten. Can growth in services have
spillover effects that contribute to the growth of manufacturing1? If so, will service sector
spillover effects into manufacturing improve India’s employment rate? India’s biggest
challenge going into the twenty-first century is no different than its biggest challenge
following independence and that will be to address the continuing problems of poverty
and illiteracy. While India has done well, it still can do better. With 25% of its population
living below the poverty line, a literacy rate of less than 50% for women and just under
two thirds for men, and unemployment hovering around 11%, India’s success in services
is tempered by the reality that it still has a long way to go to modernize all of Indian
society (CIA World Fact Book 2010). The key to future growth in India is bringing the
benefits of development to all of Indian society.

1

Under the traditional model of industrialization development, as industry develops, spillover
effects accumulate and promote the growth of services.

63

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1956 Industrial Policy Resolution. India.
Ahluwalia, Montek S. 2002. "Economic Reforms in India since 1991: Has Gradualism
Worked?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association,
16(3): 67-88
Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. (1965). The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. New York: Little, Brown and
Company.
Amsden, A. (1985). “The state and Taiwan’s economic development” In P. Evans, D.
Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the state back (pp. 78–106). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Banga, Rashmi. (2005). "Critical issues in India's services-led growth," Indian Council
for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi Working Papers
171, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New
Delhi, India
Bareau, Paul, Roland Bird, and Andrew Shonfield. 1957. “India’s Second Five-Year
Plan” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 33(3):
301-309.
Basu, Kaushik. 2004. India’s Emerging Economy Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. United States of America.
Baum, Matthew, A. and David A.Lake. (2003). “The Political Economy of Growth:
Democracy and Human Capital” American Journal of Political Science 47(2):
333-347.
Bayly, C.A. (1990). Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (The New
Cambridge History of India Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Belmekki, Belkacem. (2008). “ A Wind of Change: The New British Colonial Policy in
Post-Revolt India” Atlantis Journal of the Spanish Association of Anglo-American
Studies 30(2): 111-124.
Boone, C. (1994). “States and ruling classes in postcolonial Africa: the enduring
contradictions of power” In J. Migdal, A. Kohli, & V. Shue (Eds.), State power
and social forces: domination and transformation in the Third World (pp. 108–
139). New York: Cambridge University Press.
BPO India. (2010). “About the Site” < http://www.bpoindia.org/about/intro.shtml)>
Accessed 22 Feb 2010.
64

Chai, Joseph C.H. and Kartik C. Roy. 2006. Economic Reform in China and India.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Chandra, Rupa. (2007). “Services” in Kaushik Basu Ed., The Oxford University
Companion Economics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
CIA World Fact Book. (2010). “India” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld- factbook/geos/in.html> Accessed 9 Jan 2010.
DeCosta, Anthony P. 2006. “Economic Nationalism in Motion: Steel, Auto and Software
Industries in India” Paper presented at the XIV Congress of the International
Economic History Association (August 21-25, 2006).
DeLong, J. Bradford, 2003, "India Since Independence: An Analytic Growth Narrative,"
in Dani Rodrik, ed., in In Search of Prosperity: Analytic narratives on economic
growth Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Deutsch. Karl W. (1961). “Social Mobilization and Political Development” The
American Political Science Review 55(3): 493-514.
Gerschenkron. Alexander. (1966). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Das, Gurcharan. 2006. “The India Model” Foreign Affairs. 85(4): 1-16.
Index Mundi. (2010) “India’s Demographic Profile”
<http://www.indexmundi.com/India/demographics_profile.html> accessed 15 Jan
2010.
Gallagher, John and Anil Seal. (1981). “Britain and India Between the Wars” Modern
Asian Studies 15(3): 387-414.
Ghani, Ejaz. (2010). “The Services Revolution in India” on Voxeu.org
<http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4673> Accessed 3 March 2010.
Gilpin, Robert. (2001). Global Political Economy Understanding the International
Economic Order Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gordon, James and Poonam Gupta. (2004). “Understanding India’s Services Revolution”
IMF Working Paper. 04/171.
Government of India. Planning Commission. (1985). Seventh Five Year Plan
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.html
--(1980). Sixth Five Year Plan.

65

http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.htm
--(1974). Fifth Five Year Plan.
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.html
--(1969). Fourth Five Year Plan.
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.html
--(1961). Third Five Year Plan.
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.html.
--(1956). Second Five Year Plan.
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.html
--(1951). First Five Year Plan.
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.html
Hathaway, Oona. (2002). “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” The Yale Law
Journal 111(8): 1935-2042.
Huff, W. G. (1994). The economic growth of Singapore: trade and development in the
twentieth century. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Jenson, J. Bradford and Lori G. Kletzer. (2005). “Tradable Services: Understanding the
Scope and Impact of Services Offshoring” Brookings Trade Forum pp. 75-116.
Joshi, Vijay and Ian Malcolm David Little. (1994). India : Macroeconomics and Political
Economy 1964-1991. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Kapila, Uma. Ed. (2009). Indian Economy at Independence. New Delhi: Academic
Foundation.
Kathari, Rajni. (1964). “The Congress ‘System’ in India” Asian Survey 4(2): 1161-1173.
Kesevan, Mukul. (2007). “India’s Model Democracy” BBC News Online
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/6943598.stm> Accessed 11Nov
2009.
Kohli, Atul. (2009). “Democracy and Development: Essays on the State, Society, and
Economy” Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-- (2007). “State, Business, and Economic Growth in India” Comparative
Internationa Development 42: 87-114.
66

-- (2004). State Directed Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.
-- (1994). “Where do high growth political economies come from? The Japanese
lineage of Korea’s ‘developmental state’” World Development 22(9):
1269–1293.
-- (1990). Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability
NewYork: NY: Cambridge University Press.
Lange, Matthew K. (2004). “British Colonial Legacies and Political Development” World
Development 32(6): 905-922.
-- (2003). “Embedding the colonial state: a comparative-historical analysis of
state building and broad-based development in Mauritius” Social Science
History 27(3): 397–423.
Lindblom, Charles E. (1977). Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic
Systems. New York: Basic Books.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1959). “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy” The American Political Science Review
53(1): 69-105.
Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and Subject. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. (2010). “Polity IV Project: Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008”
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm#top> Accessed 29 March
2010.
Menon, V.P. (1958). The Transfer of Power in India Chennai, India: Orient Longman
Ltd.
Migdal, J. (1988). Strong societies and weak states: state– society relations and state
capabilities in the Third World Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Moore, Barrington. (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston, MA: Beacon Press Books.
Morris, Morris, David. (1965). The Emergence of an Industrial Labor Force in India: A
Study of the Bombay Cotton Mills, 1854-1947. California: University of
California Press.
Narain, Iqbal. (1969). “Democratic Politics and Political Development in India” Asian
Survey 10(2): 88-99.
67

Neumayer, Eric. (2005). “Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for
Human Rights?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(6): 1-29.
Palmer, Norman D. (1976). “India in 1975:Democracy in Eclipse,” Asian Survey 26(2):
95-110
Panagariya, Arvind. 2004. “IMF Working Paper: India in the 1980s and 1990s: A
Triumph of Reforms” IMF ResearChapter Department.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp0443.pdf . Accessed December
1, 2009.
Prime Ministers of India. (2010).“Shri Desai” < http://pmindia.nic.in/former.htm>
Accessed 17 Jan 2010.
Przeworski, Adam and Limongi, Fernando. (1997). “Modernization: Theories and Facts.”
World Politics 49(2): 155-183.
Queen Victoria's Proclamation. (2008, August 22). In Wikisource, The Free Library.
Retrieved 14:17, March 30, 2010, from
http://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=Queen_Victoria%27s_Proclamation&
oldid=744373
Rakshit, Mihir. (2008). Macroeconomics of Post-reform India. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Reder, M.W. (1941). “Service Industries and the Volume of Employment” The American
Economic Review 31(3): 512-519.
Reno, W. (1995). Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Singh, L.P. (1971). “Political Development of Political Decay in india?” Pacific Affairs.
44(1): 65-80.
Spear, Percival. (1958). “Britain’s Transfer of Power in India” Pacific Affairs 31(2): 173180.
Thakur, Ramesh C. (1976). “The Fate of India’s Parliamentary Democracy” Pacific
Affairs. 49(2): 263-293.
University of Chicago Task Force Report. 2006. “Economic Reform in India”
http://harrissChapterool.uChaptericago.edu/News/pressreleases/IPP%20Economic%20Reform%20in%20India.pdf. Accessed Dec 1,
2009.

68

Varshney, Ashutosh. (1998). “Why Democracy Survives” Journal of Democracy 9(3):
36-50.
Wade, R. (1990). Governing the Market. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
World Bank. (2009). “India: Data, Projects, Research”
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEX
T/INDIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:295589~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:2
95584,00.html Accessed 9 Nov 2009.

69

